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Brief Facts
SM Integrated Transware (SMI) sought a new tenant for its warehouse and entered into negotiations with
Schenker Singapore (Schenker). Negotiations took place over an extended length of time, and were partly
oral and partly by way of e-mail. The parties discussed a letter of intent and a logistics services agreement in
draft form, but never signed the documents. Eventually, Schenker withdrew from the negotiations. SMI
claimed damages, but Schenker argued that there was no contract to form the basis of damages.
One of the issues that emerged was whether the chain of e-mails fulfilled the requirements of section 6(d)
of the Civil Law Act (“CLA”) for a promise or agreement or a memorandum or note thereof to be in writing
and to be signed by the party, for a party to be bound by such an exchange of communications. Such e-
mails, under Singapore’s Electronic Transactions Act (“ETA”), would constitute electronic records and would
not be denied legal effect solely on the ground that they are electronic records. Specifically, section 7 of the
ETA provides that
“(w)here a rule of law requires information to be written, in writing, to be presented in writing or
provides for certain consequences if it is not, an electronic record satisfies that rule of law if the
information contained therein is accessible so as to be usable for subsequent reference”.
However, section 4(1)(d) of the ETA sets out that sections 6 to 9 of the ETA
“shall not apply to any rule of law requiring writing or signatures in …. any contract for the sale or other
disposition of immovable property, or any interest in such property”.
Thus the court was faced with three questions:
1. Does section 4(1)(d) of the ETA necessarily 
preclude all e-mails from satisfying section 6(d)
of the CLA?
2. Do the e-mails constitute a memorandum or
note in writing?
3. Do the e-mails constitute a signature of the
party to the agreement? 
Turning to section 4(1)(d) of the ETA, the court
ruled that its effect is that in respect of a contract
for the sale or other disposition of immovable
property, or any interest in such property, the
provisions of the ETA that enable electronic records
and signatures to satisfy legal requirements for
writing and signature cannot be relied upon. That
would be different from saying that by virtue of
section 4(1)(d) of the ETA, the e-mails do not
satisfy the requirements for writing and signature
under section 6(d) of the CLA. Whether an e-mail
can satisfy the requirements for writing and
signature found in that provision will be decided
by construing section 6(d) of the CLA itself.
The court found that the aim of the Statute of
Frauds, which was the predecessor of the CLA,
was to help protect people and their property
against fraud and sharp practice by legislating that
certain types of contracts could not be enforced
unless there was written evidence of their
existence and their terms. Recognising electronic
correspondence as being “writing” for the
purpose of section 6(d) of the CLA, would be
entirely consonant with the aim of the CLA, as
long as the existence of the writing can be proved.
The parties had readily admitted into evidence
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the e-mails and their contents. The court found
sufficient details of all the material terms of the
contract in the exchange of the ten e-mails to
satisfy the writing requirement of section 6(d) of
the CLA.
The court also took a pragmatic approach to
what is capable of fulfilling the signature
requirement. The court took the view that the
“signature” requirement has been very loosely
interpreted: it need not be at the foot of the
memorandum and it need not be a signature in
the popular sense of the word, a printed slip may
suffice if it contains the name of the defendant.
The court accepted that a typewritten name in the
e-mail is capable of constituting a signature. In
relation to e-mails which did not have a signature
in the form of a typewritten name, the court held
that the name appearing next to the e-mail
address in the sender identification field gave rise
to an inference that the sender clearly intended to
identify himself and omitted to type in his name as
he knew that his name would appear in the e-mail
message header.
Analysis
The court took a very pragmatic approach to
the construction of the two pieces of legislation.
Even though the ETA was drafted conservatively to
exclude certain transactions, the commercial reality
required that the transactions could still be carried
out electronically if the parties intended it to be so,
unless the statutory requirements were absolutely
clear that it could not. The court also extended the
interpretation of what would constitute a
signature in an e-mail – many people set up their
e-mail clients to state their name and e-mail
address as part of the setup requirements (for
instance, in Microsoft Outlook) and may not
intend for such a feature to be used as personal
identification. In a non-commercial context or if
the sender had belonged to a different generation,
he may have set up his account by using a
nickname - this may not necessarily lead to the
converse inference.
Reported by Bryan Tan, Singapore
correspondent
